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processing is generally lateralized to the right hemisphere (Gainotti, 
1997, 2000). Emotion communication (Wittling and Roschmann, 
1993; Wittling, 1995), autonomic functions of emotion (Canli et al., 
1998; Davidson, 1993), and the subjective experience of emotions 
(Davidson, 1998) are all thought to be preferentially processed in 
the right hemisphere. In contrast, the valence hypothesis claims that 
the right hemisphere is specialized for processing negative emo-
tions whereas the left hemisphere is specialized for positive emo-
tions (Ross, 1984; Meadows and Kaplan, 1994; Borod et al., 1997). 
Yet contrary to both lateralization hypotheses, results from other 
studies have failed to find hemispheric specialization for emotional 
processing (Braun et al., 2005; Tamietto et al., 2007).
One possible explanation for the mixed findings in the literature 
is that the lateralization of emotion has been studied primarily 
at a broad level, for example, comparing positive and negative 
emotion. A more narrowed focus on the functional domain of an 
emotion might lead to more nuanced patterns of how emotion is 
processed in the brain. For instance, the results of one study sug-
gested that emotions related to social experiences may be more 
left-lateralized than those that are not (Ross et al., 1994). In Ross 
et al. (1994), subjects were injected with sodium amobarbital into 
the right and left carotid arteries for neurosurgical purposes, and 
were asked to recount verbally an emotional life event before and 
IntroductIon
The lateralization of brain function is a consistent finding in neuro-
science. The idea that the cerebral hemispheres are not functionally 
or structurally identical was noted over 130 years ago by Broca 
(1887), who described the human brain as being the “most asym-
metrical” brain of all animals. It is well-known that functions such 
as language and motor control tend to be lateralized (Vallortigara 
et al., 1999), and recent research has shown that aspects of moral 
and emotional processing may be lateralized as well (Ross, 1984; 
Meadows and Kaplan, 1994; Borod et al., 1997; Gainotti, 1997, 2000; 
Demaree et al., 2005; Miller et al., 2010; Young et al., 2010). To the 
extent that neural circuitry reveals additional hypotheses regarding 
evolved function, the laterality of moral processing can shed light 
on additional facets of the neural and evolutionary underpinnings 
of social behavior.
Emotions – including arousal and valence – are integral aspects 
of moral processing (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Tangney et al., 2007; 
Young and Koenigs, 2007; Young and Saxe, 2009). They guide our 
(frequently intuitive) judgments about emotionally aversive harms, 
for instance. Results of studies examining hemispheric laterality 
of emotional processes have led to two working hypotheses: the 
right hemisphere hypothesis and the valence hypothesis (Demaree 
et al., 2005). The right hemisphere hypothesis posits that emotion 
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of pictures with moral content (“immoral”), negative pictures 
without moral content (“non-moral”), and neutral pictures 
(Harenski et al., 2008).
By drawing upon these three diverse studies, we can examine 
the lateralization of moral processing across several paradigms 
utilizing both linguistic and pictorial stimuli, implicit and explicit 
processing, and different classes of moral stimuli (sexual and non-
sexual). Given the left-lateralization of social emotional process-
ing (Ross et al., 1994) and the dearth of direct assessment of the 
laterality of moral processing, we hypothesized that the processing 
of immoral stimuli, relative to non-moral stimuli, would also be 
left-lateralized.
MaterIals and Methods
All participants were healthy, right-handed adults. Written, 
informed, institutional review board-approved consent was 
obtained from each participant.
study 1: IMplIcIt evaluatIons of Moral and non-Moral acts In 
a MeMory-recognItIon task
Participants
Fifty males [mean age, 25 years; standard deviation (SD) = 6] were 
recruited from Hartford Hospital and Yale University.
Stimuli and task
During scanning, participants were given a simple memory-
recognition task that has been shown previously to tap affective 
processing (Kiehl et al., 2005). Participants saw a total of four 
types of statements: statements involving pathogen-related acts 
(Pathogen; e.g., You eating your sister’s spoiled hamburger, You 
sipping your sister’s urine, You eating your sister’s scab), incestuous 
acts (Incest; e.g., You giving your sister an orgasm, You watching 
your sister masturbate, You fondling your sister’s nipples), non-
sexual immoral acts (Non-Sexual Immoral; e.g., You burglarizing 
your sister’s home, You killing your sister’s child, You knocking 
your sister down the stairs), and neutral acts (Neutral; e.g., You 
reading to your sister, You holding your sister’s groceries, You clos-
ing the door to your sister’s closet). Statements were divided into 
short memorize–recognize blocks, where each block contained only 
one type of statement. During the memorize phase of each block, 
participants were presented with four statements to memorize. 
During the recognize phase, they were again presented with four 
statements, but here they were instructed to report whether each 
statement was from the previous memorize phase or a new state-
ment. Two randomly selected statements from the memorize phase 
were shown in the recognize phase. A total of six statements were 
shown in each memorize–recognize block: two shown only in the 
memorize phase, two shown only in the recognize phase, and two 
shown in both the memorize and recognize phase.
Each statement was shown for 2500 ms with an intertrial 
interval of 500 ms. Participants pressed one button if the state-
ment was from the previous memorize phase or another but-
ton if it was a new statement. Participants completed two runs 
of 12 memorize-recognize blocks for a total of 144 statements 
(36 for each category of statement). After scanning, participants 
completed a questionnaire that asked how disgusting, how mor-
ally wrong, and how appealing each act was. t-Tests revealed that 
after the   injection. Following right-sided inactivation, subjects’ 
emotional stories were factually the same as before the injection, 
but they contained significantly more social content. According to 
the authors, when only left hemisphere functionality was intact, 
subjects retrieved “social emotions” associated with the memory 
to the exclusion of “basic emotions.” Since this study, however, 
the lateralization of social emotion and cognition has not received 
much attention, a surprising fact given the recent burgeoning of 
social cognitive neuroscience research.
Here we focus on moral processing and assess the extent to 
which neural circuitry underlying moral judgments shows hemi-
spheric lateralization. Given that the propensity for moral reason-
ing across multiple domains (e.g., incest, theft, physical assault, 
cheating, drug use, etc.) reflects the operation of evolved adapta-
tions (e.g., Lieberman et al., 2003; Kurzban et al., 2010), we aim 
to identify its associated neural organization. Research on moral 
judgment has led to two-process theories, with implicit, auto-
matic processes being driven by emotional responses, and explicit, 
controlled processes relying on cognitive control and reasoning 
(e.g., theory of mind, belief attribution, etc.; Haidt, 2001; Greene 
et al., 2004; Cushman et al., 2006). Functional imaging studies 
and studies of patients with brain damage suggest that there is a 
network of regions associated with the processing of moral stim-
uli (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Moll et al., 2005), which typically 
includes the medial prefrontal cortex, areas around the tempo-
roparietal junction, and posterior cingulate, but can also include 
areas of the anterior cingulate, anterior temporal lobe, and other 
substantial portions of the limbic system. Despite an increase in 
our understanding of the specific brain regions that are involved in 
the processing of moral stimuli, the hemispheric laterality of this 
function has not been well-studied. Recent studies of one aspect 
of moral processing, belief attribution (Miller et al., 2010; Young 
et al., 2007, 2010; Young and Saxe, 2008, 2009), have implicated 
the right temporoparietal junction, though the medial prefrontal 
cortex, precuneus, and left temporoparietal junction have also been 
identified. Thus it is still unclear whether one hemisphere is more 
important for moral processing from the analyses carried out in 
these previous imaging studies.
Here we reanalyze data from three separate studies and test the 
hypothesis that processing of moral violations, which involves 
social emotion, is associated with functional left hemispheric 
asymmetry. Here we use the term “immoral” to represent a moral 
violation, “pro-moral” to represent a morally positive attitude 
or behavior, “moral” to represent stimuli with moral content 
(incorporating both “immoral” and “pro-moral”), and “non-
moral” to represent stimuli without moral content. Each of the 
three studies employed different methods to investigate moral 
psychology. Study 1 used a memory-recognition task where 
subjects were presented with four types of statements: patho-
gen-related, sexual immoral, non-sexual immoral, and neutral 
statements. This study looked at implicit moral processing, that 
is, the processing of moral stimuli without the explicit instruction 
to attend to moral content and make moral judgments (Schaich 
Borg et al., 2008). Study 2 required participants to explicitly judge 
as wrong or not wrong various non-controversial immoral, non-
controversial pro-moral, and morally controversial acts. In study 
3, participants were asked to make explicit moral   judgments Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  3
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maximum of 10 s to respond, and responses were followed by 1–6 s 
of black screen. The next stimulus began immediately. Stimuli were 
randomized and counter-balanced over three runs.
MRI data acquisition and preprocessing
See Table 1 for details on image acquisition and preprocessing. One 
contrast of interest was specified to evaluate the brain regions selec-
tively involved in judging controversial acts to be wrong (i.e., requir-
ing substantial moral processing) vs. judging non-controversial acts 
to be wrong (i.e., requiring less moral processing): Controversial 
Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong.
study 3: explIcIt evaluatIon of pIctures depIctIng Moral acts: 
JudgIng how wrong Is each act
Participants
Thirty-one individuals were recruited from the Olin Neuropsychiatry 
Research Center and Trinity College in Hartford, CT, USA. One par-
ticipant was excluded for excessive head motion during scanning, 
one was excluded for poor task performance (the participant missed 
several ratings across both runs), one was excluded for psychiatric 
medication, and one was excluded for experimenter error, leaving 
27 participants (mean age, 25 years; SD = 4; 13 female).
Stimuli
During scanning, participants were shown three types of pictures: 
25 immoral, 25 non-moral, and 25 neutral. Pictures were taken 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 
1995), and supplemented with pictures from the popular media. 
Immoral pictures depicted negatively valenced scenes with clear 
moral content (e.g., an individual being assaulted, a hand breaking 
into a house, a person drinking and driving). Non-moral pictures 
depicted negatively valenced scenes without moral content (e.g., 
two individuals arguing, a mutilated hand, a person exhibiting 
“road rage”). Neutral pictures were neither positively nor nega-
tively valenced and contained no moral content (e.g., a conver-
sation, a hand being fingerprinted, a person driving normally). 
Pictures categorized as immoral and non-moral were selected as 
such based on moral content ratings of a larger sample of pictures 
by two separate groups of participants (Harenski and Hamann, 
2006). Immoral and non-moral pictures were matched on emo-
tional arousal and social complexity (Harenski and Hamann, 2006; 
Harenski et al., 2008).
Task
Participants were instructed that they would see a series of pictures 
depicting people and events. For each picture, participants were told 
to decide whether it contained a moral violation. If they judged the 
picture to contain a moral violation, they were told to rate the sever-
ity of the violation on a scale from 1 (no violation) to 5 (most severe 
violation). If they judged the picture to contain no moral violation, 
they were instructed to give a rating of 1. It was emphasized that 
participants should make judgments based on their own opinions, 
not what society or other people would think.
Each picture was displayed for 6 s. After 6 s, a rating scale was 
displayed, which consisted of a red bar that grew continuously 
from 1 to 5 over the course of 4 s. Participants pressed a button to 
stop the bar when it reached the number corresponding to their 
incest and non-sexual immoral acts were rated as equally immoral 
(p = 0.15), incest and pathogen stimuli were equally disgusting 
(p = 0.12), and incest and non-sexual immoral acts were equally 
unappealing (p = 0.51).
MRI data acquisition and preprocessing
See Table 1 for details on image acquisition and preprocessing. 
One contrast of interest was specified to evaluate the effects of the 
immoral acts (Incest + Non-Sexual Immoral; Immoral > Neutral) 
and another contrast of interest was specified to control 
for the effects of disgust processing (Immoral  >  Pathogen). 
Incest  >  Neutral and Non-Sexual Immoral  >  Neutral were 
also evaluated separately to ensure that the effects of the 
Immoral > Neutral contrast were not due solely to the sexual 
stimuli of the Incest condition.
study 2: explIcIt evaluatIon of Moral acts: JudgIng acts to be 
“wrong” or “not wrong”
Participants
Twenty-three individuals (mean age, 32 years; SD =  11) were 
recruited (15 female) from the Olin Neuropsychiatry Research 
Center in Hartford, CT, USA and Yale University.
Stimuli and task
During scanning, participants were shown three types of statements: 
50 statements describing acts that most people think are immoral 
(e.g., drunk driving, stealing money, lying), 50 statements that most 
people think are pro-moral (e.g., working hard, feeding the hungry, 
being faithful), and 50 statements that are morally controversial 
(e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion, euthanasia). Participants pressed 
one button if they judged the act to be “wrong” and another button 
if they judged the act to be “not wrong.” Participants were allowed a 
Table 1 | MRI data acquisition and preprocessing.
  Study 1  Study 2  Study 3
Scanner  Siemens  Siemens  Siemens 
  Allegra 3T  Allegra 3T  Allegra 3T
Sequence  Gradient  Gradient  Gradient 
  echo planar  echo planar  echo planar
Repetition  1500  1500  1500 
time (TR, ms)
Echo time (TE, ms)  27  27  27
Flip angle  70°  70°  65°
Field of view  24  24  24 
(FOV, cm)
Acquisition matrix  64 × 64  64 × 64  64 × 64
Voxel size (mm)  3.75 × 3.75 × 4  3.75 × 3.75 × 4  3.44 × 3.44 × 5
Gap/slices  1 mm/29  1 mm/29  0 mm/30
Spatial smoothing  12  9  8 
(FWHM)
Software  SPM5  SPM5  SPM5
After data acquisition, each run was realigned to the first scan of the run using 
INRIalign (Freire et al., 2002). They were then motion corrected, normalized to 
a standard MNI template, and spatially smoothed. Low frequency noise was 
removed using a high-pass filter.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  4
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are presented as different colors in the figures: red = both sides 
positive; blue = left positive, right negative; yellow = left nega-
tive, right positive; green = both sides negative. There were no 
significant left negative, right negative (i.e., green) voxels. Finally, 
a step was needed to account for the possibility of finding a 
significant laterality effect where no significant main effect of 
condition existed. Therefore, main effects masks for each con-
trast of interest were created and applied to the data from the 
functional asymmetry analyses.
conJunctIon analysIs
Another potential method for assessing the laterality and com-
monality among three studies is to perform a conjunction analysis 
on each contrast of interest. The conjunction analysis is a stringent 
test, and evaluates regions that are common to all three studies 
(i.e., a logical AND statement) for the specific contrasts of interest 
(Nichols et al., 2005). A conjunction analysis was performed using 
SPM5 defaults that incorporated Study 1 (Immoral > Pathogen), 
Study 2 (Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong), and 
Study 3 (Immoral > Non-Moral). A subtraction procedure was 
then used to lateralize the images by determining the hemisphere 
with the higher t-value for each cluster.
results
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was utilized in 
three studies investigating the neural correlates of moral processing 
(Harenski et al., 2008; Schaich Borg et al., 2008). Laterality analyses 
were then performed (Stevens et al., 2005; Figure 1; Table 2).
study 1
The main effects of non-sexual immoral, incest, and pathogen statement 
processing have been described elsewhere (Schaich Borg et al., 2008), 
and the main effects of Immoral > Neutral and Immoral > Pathogen 
desired rating of that particular picture. Immoral, non-moral, 
and neutral pictures were presented in randomized order, and 
25 null events of the same duration as picture trials consist-
ing of a black screen and white fixation cross were randomly 
interspersed with the pictures, creating jitter between picture 
trials. The 100 total trials (immoral, non-moral, neutral, and 
fixation) were divided into two equal runs with 50 trials occur-
ring in each run.
MRI data acquisition and preprocessing
See Table 1 for details on image acquisition and preprocessing. 
Two contrasts of interest were specified: one that controlled for the 
effects of general emotional processing (Immoral > Non-Moral) 
and a control contrast that evaluated the effects of no moral viola-
tion (Non-Moral > Neutral).
functIonal heMIspherIc asyMMetry statIstIcal analysIs
The hemispheric asymmetry statistical procedure developed by our 
group is described in detail elsewhere (Stevens et al., 2005). After 
completing the first-order statistics for each study, the data were 
spatially normalized to a hemispherically symmetrical template in 
order to directly compare hemodynamic activity between the left 
and right hemispheres. A symmetrical template was needed because 
of the anatomical differences between the two hemispheres that 
exist in the default Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) tem-
plate provided with SPM. The symmetrical template was created 
by flipping the SPM5 echo planar imaging (EPI) template along 
the y-axis to create two images: one with the left hemisphere on 
both sides and one with the right hemisphere on both sides. These 
images were then averaged to create the symmetrical template. We 
then calculated the parameters necessary to spatially normalize each 
participant’s images to the symmetrical template, thereby providing 
a less anatomically biased way of comparing hemodynamic activity 
in each hemisphere.
After these parameters were calculated, we compared hemo-
dynamic activity in left hemisphere voxels and right hemisphere 
voxels in order to identify areas where the amplitude of the hemo-
dynamic response differed between the two hemispheres. For each 
voxel in the right hemisphere, the amplitude of the hemodynamic 
response was subtracted from the corresponding voxel in the left 
hemisphere and vice versa in order to produce images with positive 
voxels in both hemispheres. The images for each participant and 
each condition of interest were then used in a series of second-
level random effects SPM analyses. We performed one-sample 
t-tests on the contrast images for each task’s contrasts of interest. 
Significant peak voxel coordinates and t-score statistics are reported 
for local maxima.
After processing, additional steps were taken in order to iden-
tify asymmetry effects. For each positive voxel, there could be 
one of three types of relationships: (a) positive signal change 
in one hemisphere and negative signal change in the other, (b) 
positive signal change in one hemisphere that is greater than 
the positive signal change in the other, and (c) negative signal 
change in one hemisphere that is smaller than negative signal 
change in the other. In order to address this issue, masks were 
created for each type of relationship (positive vs. negative, posi-
tive vs. positive, and negative vs. negative) and were applied to 
the images from the asymmetry analyses. These relationships 
FIguRE 1 | Visual representation of laterality effects. For each significant 
effect in each hemisphere (A, left hemisphere; B, right hemisphere), there are 
three possible relationships, each indicated by a different color. Red 
represents regions in which there was positive signal change in both 
hemispheres, with the indicated hemisphere having a more positive signal 
change (found in left or right hemisphere). Blue represents positive signal 
change in the left hemisphere and negative signal change in the right 
hemisphere (found in left hemisphere only). Yellow represents negative signal 
change in the left hemisphere and positive signal change in the right 
hemisphere (found in right hemisphere only). Green represents negative 
signal change in both hemispheres, with the indicated hemisphere having a 
smaller negative signal change (there were no significant voxels for this 
relationship).Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  5
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significant engagement of the left medial frontal gyri (BA 10/11), 
right medial frontal gyrus (BA 32), left inferior temporal gyrus (BA 
20), right middle (BA 21) and superior (BA 22) temporal gyri, right 
inferior parietal lobe (BA 40), and right cingulate gyrus (BA 31).
study 2
The main effects of judging non-controversial wrong, not wrong, 
and controversial acts have been described elsewhere, and the main 
effects of Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong can be 
found in Figure 2.
Laterality analysis of Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial 
Wrong
Brain activity associated with judging controversial statements 
to be wrong was compared to brain activity associated with 
judging non-controversial statements to be wrong (Figure 6; 
Table 2). Laterality analysis (FDR corrected, p < 0.05) revealed 
significant engagement in left middle (BA 9) and superior (BA 
10) frontal gyri, left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 47), and left 
superior parietal cortex (BA 7).
can be found in Figure 2. The components of the Immoral > Neutral 
contrast were analyzed separately (Figure 5) to ensure that the effects 
were not due solely to the sexual nature of the stimuli.
Laterality analysis of Immoral > Neutral
A laterality analysis was performed to identify which regions were 
preferentially engaged during the presentation of negative morally 
laden (incest and non-sexual immoral) stimuli compared with neu-
tral stimuli (Figure 3). This analysis (false discovery rate, FDR cor-
rected, p < 0.001) revealed significant engagement of the left superior 
frontal (Brodmann area, BA 8) and medial frontal gyri (BA 8/10), 
left inferior temporal/fusiform gyrus (BA 37), left supramarginal 
gyrus (BA 40), left posterior cingulate/precuneus (BA 31/7/24), left 
thalamus, right precentral gyrus (BA 6), and right cerebellum.
Laterality analysis of Immoral > Pathogen
This laterality analysis was performed to identify which regions 
were preferentially engaged during the processing of negative mor-
ally laden stimuli compared with disgusting, non-moral stimuli 
(Figure 4; Table 2). This analysis (FDR corrected, p < 0.05) revealed 
Table 2 | Areas of engagement in the left hemisphere in three studies of moral violation processing.
BA  Region name  Study 1  Study 2 Controversial  Study 3 
    Immoral > Pathogen  Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong  Immoral > Non-Moral
FRoNTAl loBES
9  Middle frontal gyrus  ns  8.79 (−51 3 39)***  ns
10  Medial frontal gyrus  4.07 (−12 45 18)**  ns  2.39 (−3 54 −9)+
    3.19 (−12 54 6)*   
10  Superior frontal gyrus  ns  4.90 (−18 63 21)*  2.97 (−9 57 0)*
11  Medial frontal gyrus  3.36 (−3 42 −9)**  ns  ns
n/a  Inferior frontal gyrus  ns  5.11 (−54 15 0)*  ns
      4.66 (−48 45 3)* 
47  Inferior frontal gyrus  ns  4.74 (−51 42 −9)*  3.69 (−15 27 −18)*
TEMPoRAl loBES
37  Middle temporal gyrus  ns  ns  6.03 (−60 −57 −6)*
        4.48 (−54 −51 −12)*
37  Inferior temporal gyrus  ns  ns  2.98 (−57 −69 0)*
21  Middle temporal gyrus  ns  2.55 (−39 −3 −36)++  5.63 (−63 −42 −12)**
        3.72 (−63 −48 −3)*
20  Inferior/middle temporal gyrus  3.21 (−60 −18 −27)*  3.73 (−54 −45 −15)+++  ns
28  Parahippocampal gyrus  ns  3.09 (−18 −15 −21)++  4.37 (−24 −9 −33)*
37  Parahippocampal gyrus  ns  ns  4.30 (−24 −45 −9)**
30  Parahippocampal gyrus  ns  ns  3.91 (−21 −54 −3)*
PARIETAl loBES
40  Supramarginal gyrus  3.18 (−57 −60 39)*  3.83 (−42 −51 54)+++  4.39 (−57 −60 33)*
        4.71 (−45 −63 48)**
7  Superior parietal cortex/ precuneus  ns  4.32 (−30 −66 51)*  5.26 (−12 −72 57)**
      3.86 (−27 −72 57)+++  4.69 (−9 −66 63)**
        4.10 (−6 −54 72)*
        4.15 (−33 −60 57)*
        3.67 (−21 −63 66)*
19  Precuneus  ns  ns  4.71 (−30 −78 42)*
CINgulATE/SuBCoRTICAl     
32  Anterior cingulate  ns  1.96 (−3 48 −3)+  4.07 (−3 48 6)*
BA, Brodmann area. Numbers in front of the parentheses are t-values of each cluster (MNI coordinates). *FDR corrected, p < 0.05; **FDR corrected, p < 0.01; 
***FDR corrected, p < 0.001; Uncorrected statistics are also reported for completeness. +Uncorrected, p < 0.05. ++Uncorrected, p < 0.01. +++Uncorrected, p < 0.001. Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  6
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middle temporal and fusiform gyri (BA 37), left superior parietal/
precuneus (BA 7/19), left supramarginal gyrus (BA 40), left medial 
prefrontal cortex extending into anterior cingulate (BA 10/32), and 
left parahippocampal gyrus (BA 28/36/19).
Laterality analysis of Non-Moral > Neutral
A laterality analysis of brain activity associated with pictures without 
moral content compared to a baseline condition was carried out to 
evaluate the possibility that all stimuli in this study preferentially 
engaged the left hemisphere (FDR corrected, p < 0.05). This revealed 
study 3
The main effects of immoral vs. non-moral picture viewing have 
been described elsewhere (Harenski et al., 2008), and can also be 
found in Figure 2.
Laterality analysis of Immoral > Non-Moral
Brain activity associated with viewing pictures depicting immoral 
content was compared with brain activity associated with pictures 
without moral content (Figure 7; Table 2). Laterality analysis (FDR 
corrected, p < 0.05) revealed significant engagement of the left 
FIguRE 2 | Main effects analyses. (A) Study 1: Immoral > Neutral (FDR corrected, p < 0.001); (B) Study 1: Immoral > Pathogen (FDR corrected, p < 0.05); (C) Study 
2: Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong (FDR corrected, p < 0.05); (D) Study 3: Immoral > Non-Moral (FDR corrected, p < 0.05).Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  7
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conjunction analysis of three distinct studies, results are presented 
at uncorrected levels. Commons areas of engagement in the left 
hemisphere were found in medial frontal gyrus (BA 10), superior 
frontal gyrus (BA 8), posterior cingulate (BA 31), temporopari-
etal junction (BA 39), middle temporal gyrus (BA 21), and infe-
rior temporal gyrus (BA 20). Regions in the right hemisphere 
were anterior cingulate (BA 32) and temporoparietal junction 
(BA 39).
dIscussIon
This study was designed to investigate the functional hemispheric 
laterality of processing immoral acts. Across three distinct para-
digms, we found that processing moral violations more strongly 
significant engagement in right-sided regions only, and included 
middle temporal gyrus (BA 37), lingual and fusiform gyri (BA 18), 
calcarine sulcus/cuneus (BA 17), and postcentral gyrus (BA 2). These 
regions have not been included in typical “morality networks.”
lateralIzatIon effects coMMon to processIng dIverse Moral 
stIMulI
The three main studies utilized in the present laterality analyses 
(Immoral > Pathogen, Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial 
Wrong, Immoral > Non-Moral) employed diverse morally laden 
stimuli. Despite this assortment, a number of regions were found 
to be common areas of engagement during the processing of nega-
tive morally laden stimuli (Figure 8). Due to the stringency of a 
FIguRE 3 | Study 1: Immoral > Neutral. Depicted here are areas in which 
there is a significant difference in the amplitude of the hemodynamic response 
between hemispheres, limited to areas where there was also a significant main 
effect (results are overlaid on SPM5 canonical T1 image, FDR corrected, 
p < 0.001). Areas of significant engagement include the left superior frontal and 
medial frontal gyri, left middle, and inferior temporal/fusiform gyrus, left 
supramarginal gyrus, left posterior cingulate/precuneus, left thalamus, right 
precentral gyrus, and right cerebellum.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  8
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consistency cannot be attributed to a generalized left hemisphere 
bias for the stimuli in these three studies, because the Non-
Moral > Neutral contrast in Study 3 was right-lateralized, and 
the Immoral > Pathogen contrast in Study 1 contained substantial 
clusters in the right hemisphere. Additionally, valence or emo-
tional arousal cannot explain the results, because the immoral 
and non-moral stimuli in Study 3 were equated for arousal and 
valence, and the controversial and non-controversial stimuli in 
engages the left hemisphere than the right hemisphere. Specifically, 
the left greater than right hemisphere asymmetry was found for 
processing negative morally laden stimuli in the linguistic and 
pictorial domain, during tasks that focused either on the implicit 
or explicit processing of moral content, and for different classes 
of stimuli (sexual and non-sexual). These results highlight the 
consistency of left greater than right hemisphere asymmetry for 
processing diverse forms of immoral stimuli. Importantly, this 
FIguRE 4 | Study 1: Immoral > Pathogen. Depicted here are areas in which 
there is a significant difference in the amplitude of the hemodynamic 
response between hemispheres, limited to areas where there was also a 
significant main effect (results are overlaid on SPM5 canonical T1 image, 
FDR corrected, p < 0.05). Areas of significant engagement include the left 
medial frontal gyri, right medial frontal gyrus, left inferior temporal gyrus, 
right middle and superior temporal gyri, right inferior parietal lobe, and right 
cingulate gyrus.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  9
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may be the judgment that something is a moral violation. Thus, the 
social emotion perspective may be the most parsimonious inter-
pretation of the current results.
The present data, while suggestive, do not unequivocally indicate 
that the left hemisphere is more “necessary” for processing moral 
violations than the right hemisphere. Processing of moral stimuli 
engaged several right hemisphere regions, but the present analyses 
suggest that the left hemisphere is showing greater engagement, 
reflected as higher amplitude hemodynamic response, than the 
right hemisphere. This asymmetric left hemisphere engagement 
may be a reflection of greater computational processing or some 
other cognitive process(es) such as categorical rather than graded 
judgment (e.g., Kosslyn et al., 1989). Right hemisphere involve-
ment has been found in other studies of moral processing. Recent 
studies of callosotomy patients (Miller et al., 2010) and transcra-
nial magnetic stimulation (Young et al., 2010) have implicated the 
right temporoparietal junction as being crucial for belief attribu-
tion, while others (Young et al., 2007; Young and Saxe, 2008, 2009), 
have likewise found strong evidence for the right temporoparietal 
junction in moral processing. There is evidence to suggest that 
moral judgment is not a unitary concept (Haidt, 2001; Greene 
et al., 2004; Cushman et al., 2006), so it is possible that whereas 
Study 2 and the immoral and pathogen stimuli in Study 1 were 
both negatively valenced, yet these comparisons still indicated a 
left hemisphere bias.
The extant literature supports at least two plausible interpre-
tations for the left greater than right asymmetry for processing 
immoral stimuli. One interpretation is that morally relevant nega-
tive emotions are “social emotions” that, unlike other negative emo-
tions, are lateralized to the left hemisphere. This interpretation is 
supported by Ross et al. (1994), but contradicts both the valence 
hypothesis (i.e., the left hemisphere processes positive emotions 
whereas the right hemisphere processes negative emotions) and the 
right hemisphere hypothesis (which states that emotion processing 
is right-lateralized).
An alternative interpretation is that negative emotions are right-
lateralized, but moral judgments are left-lateralized. Perhaps nega-
tive emotions on the right side draw our attention to a moral issue 
and thereby lead to moral cognition (which may include other 
emotions) and reasoning on the left side. It is important to note 
that in Studies 2 and 3, participants assessed moral content in both 
conditions (Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong and 
Immoral > Non-Moral), so it is likely not the evaluation of stimuli 
for moral content per se that engages the left hemisphere. Rather, it 
FIguRE 5 | Components of Immoral > Neutral. (A) Incest > Neutral (FDR corrected, p < 0.001); (B) Non-Sexual Immoral > Neutral (FDR corrected, p < 0.001).Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  10
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Interestingly, the observed pattern of neural engagement com-
mon to all three studies (Figure 8) is remarkably similar to the 
default mode network. This network of ventral medial prefrontal 
cortex, posterior cingulate, inferior parietal lobule, lateral temporal 
cortex, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, and hippocampus, has been 
described as an organized mode of brain function that is suspended 
during goal-directed behaviors (Raichle et al., 2001; Buckner et al., 
2008). It is also thought to be important in mentalization and 
belief   attribution relies on the right temporoparietal junction, 
moral violation processing relies more heavily on the left hemi-
sphere than the right. Additional studies of patients with unilateral 
brain damage, commisurotomy, or similar would help more fully 
delineate necessary from sufficient brain regions associated with 
processing negative morally laden stimuli. Future studies should 
also evaluate the role of gender in the hemispheric lateralization 
of moral processing.
FIguRE 6 | Study 2: Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial Wrong. 
Depicted here are areas in which there is a significant difference in the amplitude of 
the hemodynamic response between hemispheres, limited to areas where there 
was also a significant main effect (results are overlaid on SPM5 canonical T1 image, 
FDR corrected, p < 0.05). Areas of significant engagement include left middle and 
superior frontal gyri, left inferior frontal gyrus, and left superior parietal cortex.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  11
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(Levy, 1977; Vallortigara and Rogers, 2005), avoiding the duplica-
tion of bilateral processes. Hemispheric specialization has been 
observed in non-humans as well, suggesting a shared evolved 
capacity emerging as early as hundreds of millions of years ago 
(Vallortigara et al., 1999). It may be that the lateralization of 
moral violation processing, like other lateralized higher-order 
functions, arose early in our evolution to increase neural   capacity 
and efficiency.
  introspection, which are related to theory of mind (Gallagher and 
Frith, 2003). As theory of mind is an important aspect of moral 
judgment (Young et al., 2007), future studies should examine the 
lateralization of theory of mind processing and how this might be 
represented during moral judgment.
Why might the processing of moral violations be lateralized? 
It is well-established that hemispheric lateralization can be an 
efficient strategy for motor, perceptual, and cognitive functions 
FIguRE 7 | Study 3: Immoral > Non-Moral. Depicted here are areas in 
which there is a significant difference in the amplitude of the hemodynamic 
response between hemispheres, limited to areas where there was also a 
significant main effect (results are overlaid on SPM5 canonical T1 image, 
FDR corrected, p < 0.05). Areas of significant engagement include the left 
middle temporal gyrus, left fusiform gyrus, left supramarginal gyrus, left 
superior parietal/precuneus, bilateral anterior cingulate, and left 
parahippocampal gyrus.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  12
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should address the computational nature of moral processing, 
not just its functional asymmetry as we provide here. We hope 
that our findings serve as a starting point and inform future 
functionalist hypotheses.
In summary, these results indicate that there is a left hemisphere 
bias for the processing of immoral stimuli across multiple domains. 
This effect was demonstrated in three distinct paradigms, using 
Our goal here was to contribute to the characterization of 
evolved psychological adaptations by describing the neural 
organization of moral processing. Specialized neural circuitry 
has also been identified for a number of proposed adaptations 
including social exchange (Stone et al., 2002; Ermer et al., 2006), 
facial recognition (Grill-Spector et al., 2004), and theory of mind 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1999). Future studies investigating   morality 
FIguRE 8 | Conjunction analysis. Depicted here are areas of significant 
engagement that are common to all three studies (Study 1: 
Immoral > Pathogen, Study 2: Controversial Wrong > Non-Controversial 
Wrong, and Study 3: Immoral > Non-Moral). Results are overlaid on SPM5 
canonical T1 image, uncorrected, p < 0.005. Significant areas of 
engagement include the left medial frontal gyrus, left posterior cingulate, 
left temporoparietal junction, right anterior cingulate, and right 
temporoparietal junction.Frontiers in Evolutionary Neuroscience  www.frontiersin.org  December 2010  | Volume 2  | Article 110  |  13
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